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There is good ense in acknO\.vledging hybridity in public administration as a peripl1eral phenomenon relative to the core of cia sic, W berian s tyle bureau racy, whose relevance, however should be neither ignor d nor overstated . At the same time, public enterprises or public-private partnerships, competition and riva lry or participation and civil society inv lvement in the hierarchica l enviromnent of public administration do challenge public adminl lration precisely becau e they deviate from the routines and established patterns of clas ic bureaucracy and the way the laller is being regu lated and managed. l-lybridlty in public administration represents tb irregu lar as oppo ed to the regular, th unpredicwb le relative to the predictable the opaque versus what is tmn parent. and s1TuctmaJ complexity as opposed t the relative ·impHcity of monocrati bureaucra ies. What on ' may deri ve from tlus i that hybridlty in public admlni !:ration create a risk-prone env ironment that r·duce the likelihood of succe sfuJ copi ng with standard pathologies of conventional bureaucracy and incrca e tbe likelih od of new weaknesse and defici.encle to occur. Hybridity in public administration, so I claim, is a risk generator in its own right that weakens fundamental principles of administrative responsibility as a core ingredient of democratic government. This argument is presented in this paper, based on both theoretical con idet"ltions and an empirical illustration.
The nonnative yardstick of public administration being based on hierarchy, clear-cut jurisdiction and the rule of law is a consequence of public administration as a system of delegated resources and power. He or she who delegates power and resources has good reasons to ask for proper and reli<1blc usage and the users haw to re,IJ)()IId to those demands. Today, we associate this problem with the microeconomic principal-agent literature ( cf. Akerlof 1970; Grossman/Hart I n3: Holmstrom 197c ' );yet, the classic definition for the realm of public administration in a constitutional state and democratic government was given by Carl .T. Friedrich in the 1930s in his seminal study on Conslilutionol Gm . . emmcnt und Politics (Friedrich 1937, 224-243) . Friedrich characterized the modern constitutional state as being based on the dual mechanism of concentration and delegation of power and resources. Pub! ic bureaucracy, according to Friedrich, is the core of modern government since it is the nrganizational body to which power and resources are actually being cklcgated. A constitutional state is one in which the principle of responsible government is institutionalized and thus established as a covenant that binds every single member of the governmental apparatus. In the golden words of Woodrow Wilson the "indispensable conditions of responsibility" imply that "public attention must be easily directed, in each case of good or bad administration, to just the 111~111 deserving of praise or blame. There is no danger in power, if only it be not irrt:sponsiblc:. If it be divided, dealt out in sharc:s to man y. it is ubscured: and if it be obscured. it is made irresponsible. But if it be centred in heads of the service and in heads of branches ,>f the service. it i~ c~tsily w~ttched and brought to book. '' (\Vilson I Ki\7, However, institutionalization is a necessary but not a sutTicient condition of responsible government and administration. Again. as Friedrich slated in an inJ1uential article of 1940, institutional controls of responsible government and bureaucracy necessarily remain insufficient due to the considerable discretion of public officials even under the conditions of democratic government and the rule of law. Therefore, Friedrich (1940) wrote institutionalized controls have to be complemented by the personal ethics of public officials and a related sense of responsibility. Friedrich thus made the assumption of responsibility an issue of leadership based on professional and ethical standards beyond formal accountability: an mvarencss of potential consequences of one's ovvn decisions and the readiness to be held accountable for them (cf. Plant 2011) -which, by the way, was close to what Max W cber ( l9~K) had characterized as the core of an ethic of re-sponsibility (Verantwortungsethik) as opposed to an ethic of conviction ( Gesinnungsethik).
Hybrid arrangements are obviou. ly the opposite of what Wilson had in mind when he wrote about clear-cut hierarchy and of "fpower] centred in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the service" (Wilson 1887,2 14 as a prcrequi ite of responsibility i11 public administration. Hybridity inc reases tructural complexity i11 general and thus increase information asymmetries and related principal-agent prob lem . More specifically, multiple stakeholder anangements akin to hybridity contribute to fragmentation and divided chain · of command instead of monocratic hierarchies. Thi may turn into stakeholder s veto player beha ior and sp lit loyalties of taff member . Di vergent and incon istenl go ernance mechanisms w aken the commitment to domiL1ant and legitimate mechanisms for instance to the rule of law and relevant regulation derived from it in favor of business-like mentality or involvement in inter-agency turf wars. Also, enforcement of accountability through financial auditing, judicial control and parliamentary oversight may be fragmented and just concern separate segments of a hybrid arrangement.
In ' >$lim. hybrids create an unfavorab le environment for responsib le leaderhip through n variety f co unterinccntives. They increase the demands for contr I and make it easier to evade p erso nal accountabi lity. It soon became apparent that the envisaged compound was the critical factor as far as the security of the one million or more calculated visitors was concerned. Moreover, not only the compound itself but also the routes of access and evacuation tumed out to be especially delicate since they were leading through a tunnel of 24 meters width with one single ramp branching off to the compound itself. That ramp of 18 meters width had to serve as way in and way out creating the obvious risk of congestion given the expected size of the crowd that would have to use it. The related security risks were clearly articulated in the task force. According to the records (cf. Document no. What was at stake in the perception of regional politicians was the prestige of the Ruhr area altogether as far as the capability of planning and organizing a spectacular event with a particular appeal to young people was concerned. When concerns about security issues connected to the Loveparade were voiced by the head of the Duisburg police department public criticism was so harsh that even the resignation of the police chief was requested (Documt:nt no. 1 ). When the task force met on 2 October 2009, the head of division of Dc::enwt II, who chaired the meeting, explicitly reminded the participants that after the can cllation of the Lovcparade in Bochum at short notice the Duisburg Loveparadc was definitely "politically desired" (cf. Document n~. 3 ). However, it was only in early March 2010, more than four months into the planning process, that the municipal administration of Duisburg reali zed that the design of the Loveparadc (i.e. cl sed compound with limitt:d access ~md evacuation routes) implied a transfer of jurisdiction for risk assessment and public pennissi n to the ffice of regulation and supervision of construction Bauordnungswnf). The Bwwrdmmgsttmt (in short: Amt 62, according to the organizatioua l chart of lhe Dnisburg city adm ini stTation) clearly tated th at permission could not be given for the envisaged event site· its officials also made it clear that violation of the relevant l.egal provision the onderbauverordnzmg Nordrhein-Wes((a fen or decree for special construction of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia) would make any otTici:-tl involved liable under criminal law (Document no. 5 ).
From thi s point on, four and a half months before the event in question both the substantial security risks and the incompatibility of the conditions at the event site and the related legal stipulations were known to the official in charge ami documented. In the files of the Dui sb urg city administration, it was :-tlso cl early stated that an indispensable prerequisite of any permission was a formal application to be submitted by Lopavent GmbH with substantiated documentation of the relevant security measures (ibid.). Notwithstanding, what followed was a protracted planning and preparation process in which part of the Duisburg city administration sided with the event management fitm in the blunt attempt to manipulate the fact and figures and to obstruct the clear and binding stipulation of the relevant security regulation, while the responsible Amt 62 remained determined to enforce the law.
Ironically, the leading figure among those detetmined to ignore the law and to issue the permission to organize the Loveparade under any circumstances was the head of the city's division for security and law (Dezernat II) . This man was a close associate of the mayor who had expressed unmistakably his will to have the Loveparade take place in his city. Both were Christian Democrats. His opposite number as head of the division for urban development (Dezernat ji'ir Stadtentwicklung, in short: Dezernat V), to which belonged the Amt 62 belonged, was a Social Democrat. He, however, kept a low profile and did nothing to buttress the position and action strategy of administration belonging to his own jurisdiction. Under the condition of this power asymmetry between those compliant wit{! the legal security stipulations and those determined to obstruct them, Lopavent GmbH managed to outmaneuver the Bauordnungsamt. The head of Dezernat II, in transgression of his own competent jurisdiction, commissioned several separate expert reports that focused on crowd management issues. This was clearly intended to circumvent the unmistakable security stipulations of the law whose enforcement was, in tum, the task of Amt 62. None of these expert, reports submitted just a couple of weeks or even days (June and July 2010) before the Loveparade itself referred to the relevant legal provisions (cf. Documents nos. 9, 10, 11). Moreover, they were vague and peppered with salvatory clauses. Nonetheless, they served as justification for the petmission of the Loveparade, which was ultimately pushed through by the head of Dezern at II. Instead of backing the responsible unit of the city administration vis-a-vis an applicant (Lopavent GmbH), he even formed an alliance with that very private firm against the relevant security regulation and the administrative unit tasked with enforcing it. The borderline between the rule of law and a compliant public administration and private interests was not only blurred but the role and competence of public and private actors were virtually inverted. In a meeting on 1 i\ June 2010, the representatives of Lopavent GmbH admitted one more time tl~at they were not able to guarantee more than one third of the evacuation space on the event site of what the legal security provisions required ( cf. Document no. 7'). While this was astonishing and yet another unmistakable warning that authorization of the Loveparade was just not possible, the head of Dezcmut !I instructed, again in transgression of his own competent jurisdiction, the office of regulation and supervision of construction (Buurmlnungwmt) to "cooperate" with Lopavent GmbH and to support the latter in the development of a security concept for the Lovcparade scheduled for 24 July 2010. This not only meant to provoke a collision of interest -after all, the Buuordnung.lwnt as a public authority was tasked with drafting a security concept that it subsequently would have to evaluate and to certify--but also to task Amt 62 with a job it was not competent to do, namely the development of an accurate evacuation plan on the has is of crowd management data and simulation models it could possibly not have at its disposcll.
The representatives of Amt 62 participating in the meeting of 1 S June 2010 articulated precisely this , but to no avail. Their superior, the head of the division of urban development (Dezemut V), supported this stance through a handwritten remark on the margin of the report written by the head of Ami 62 ·tating lhat the envisaged procedure wa not conform to proper administrative practice and that Dezemcrt II -instead of his own divisionwould have to take al l the rei vant deci. ions .2 This tatement was right and wrong at the same time. While it was entirely correct lhal the n isevakaged procedme violated basic principles of proper admini trative practice. the head of Dezernat V was -..vrong in assuming d1at it wa at his personal di scretion to concede the jurisdiction .for th relevant deci ·ion to Dezernal II. On the contrary, it wa. his own personal obligation t make sure that the Bauordmmgsamt evaluated Lopavent's security concept in accordance with the legal requirements and, if necessary, to deny authorization of the Loveparade as long as the requirements were not met. Instead, the head of Dezernal V bluntly refused to be involved in the relevant dec is ion making -a classic case of blame shifting that was itself improper and an act of irresponsibility.
It was. ironically th~.: pl'iva tc even t management tirm Lopavent instead of the public authority actually in charge that 611 d tb vacuwn created by the fai lure of the head of D zenwt V to ins i t on a proper evaluali n and certification of the security concept. Representatives of Lopavent GmbH pa ·ticipatcd in yet another meeting held 25 June 2010 and devoted to the unreso lved security issues . Tb e prim purpose of lhi me ting wa not the development of a ecurity cone pt itself but an agreement on how to evaluate such n con pl. That agr ement entai led the intent to coum1is. ion another expert report on the vacuati n plan to be deve loped . a cording to tl1e previou, instructions by the head of the divi s ion of e urity a nd law 62 . lt is in no way in accordance with pr pc.r ad mini Lruti ve procedure aud an appropriate conu·o l C)!' the project. In every respecr, the decision lays wi th [di isioo) II.] .
fied by the rele va nt public agency, participated in (it-liberations whose subject was the ve ry procedure of evalu:~tion and ce rti fic:~tion whose result directl y affected th e pri va te firm applying for permi ssion.
Another telling del:~il Llf the replacement of what should have been an independent and unfettered examination by an irregular procedure was that the group of consulting engineers authorized to eva luate the security concept was, according to information pro id ee! on th ei r website, a spin-off of the chair of the very professor uf physics at the university of Duisburg who himself was authorized to eva luatc and to certify the report of the engineers who were hi s former students and PhD candidates. Not onl y was this se ries o f colli sion of interests not corrected or terminated, they were , instead. literally designed and organized by the Duisburg city admini stration w ith the obvious intent to suspend the reg ul ar procedure of an independent assessment of the security and evacuation concept for an event invo lving approximately one million visitors.
Exhausted by wh~1t may be called a war of allrition aga inst an alliance or hi gh ranking public officinls :~ncl the private eve nt management finn. the Buuoulnung1·unll finally g~we in and issued the permission to have th e Lovcparade held a::; planned. Th:~t happened on 23 July ~()I 0 -24 hours before the event. In re vea ling clarity, the wording of the authorizing per-'mi ss ion made ~1pparent that th e security requirements of the relevant legal provision, the Sundcrh £1/!l 'Cmrdnung, were not met by th e security concept submitted by Lopaven t Gm bH (Document no. I~). In iss uing the permission anyway, the Buuonlnungsu1111, under the relentless press ure of the head or Dc:::anut 1!, made use of :~n ildmini strativ e discretion, whose existence it had explicitly denied so t~u-( cf. Document no. 6, p. 5 ).
On the afternoon of24 Jul y 2010, panic broke out in the totall y overcrowded tunnel leading to the even t site and on the. ril mp Lh:-tl br~mched off to the actual compound where the final segment of th e Lo veparade was takin g place. Most of the 2 1 casualties we re caused by tlwra x contusion . The ramp, serving as access and ex it at the same Lim e, turned out to be a fatal trap without escape routes -a t~'lcl that was known to the private organizer ~mel the relevant authorities fro m the very outset but had nul prevented the rdevant authority to issu e a permission that should never han: been given.
Case Analysis
The planning and prepa ra tion of the Duisburg Loveparade of 20 II) was a process in which hybridity in public administration came to bear and u11-folded its undesirable consequences in an almost classic fashion. This entailed both manifest and latent hybridity. The cooperation of the Duisburg city administration and the private event management firm Lopavent GmbH was a typical case of public-private partnership. It was manifest and as such uncontested. However, it turned out to be a pennissive environment for irresponsible leadership characterized by risk taking behavior that inevitably put human lives in jeopardy and ultimately caused conditions on the ground that resulted in the death of 21 predominantly young people.
However, what exactly were the mechanisms that made reasonable people take disastrous decisions at the expenses of others and why did nobody seriously intervene to stop a disaster in the making despite early warnings and crystal clear-legal provisions that should have compelled the decision makers to prohibit the Loveparade altogether? And how exactly were those mechanisms connected to the hybrid nature of the organizational structure in which the decision making process was embedded?
Out of the above mentioned four risk factors of hybrid arrangements that potentially create counterincentives for responsible leadership -structural complexity, mu ltiple stakeholder arrangements, inconsi ten l governance me hanisms, fragmented accountability -lructural comple ity and rragmented accountability were irrelevant. Quite on the contrary, the organizational structure was a simple hybrid in the form of public-private partnership and the jurisdiction for the authorization of the Loveparade lay with one single authority, the Bauordnungsomt or Amt 62 of the city administration. The accountability structure was one-dimensional as well. The only relevant question was whether or not the security concept submitted by Lopavant GmbH was meeting the security standards laid down in of the relevant legal provision, the Sonderbauverurdnung NordrhcinWestf"a/e/1. However, the decisive factors that transformed a simple Yes or No question to be answered by one single authority in accordance with clear and unmistakable legal prescription into a quagmire of tensions and conflicts among the main participants and divergent loyalties of public officials were the multiple stakeholder logic of the public-private partnership and the inconsistent governance mechanisms that resulted from it. The other one was a mec hani sm ofp ol iti c:t l entrepreneurship :md prestige-seeking. These mech~misms were not abstr:tct structural imperati,·cs , they were bmught to bear by key ~tctors w ith di Cferent leve ls of power resources and di ffe rent opti ott s of coalition building. Th ose who promoted the Love paradc for the sake of profit am\ prestige could rel y on the support of th e public at brge. the media. an d th e loca l and political eli te ac ros s p:nty lines. Henc e, the almost natural ~1lli a nce uf th e city mayor and his men wi th Lup av cnt GmbH. By contrast, those in charge of enforc in g safety regubtion and securi ty me8S Lll' CS were on the defensive l'mm the very outset' and had no polit ica l all y at all. The y not even enj oy ed the forc eful support of the rel evant head of division (D,·::.er (Bwtor lnung '01111) . However, they were directly exposed t the political pre ure exctted by their own hea I of division who made it clear from th e very beginning tbat it wa · the politi.caJ wil l of the city mayor and himself to ba e the Lov parade pe1fonned in Duisburg under any ·iTcum tam; s. So Lhey were probably subje ted to what is knm. n as gmup think. a tendency to upprcs a deviant opinion und r the soc· ial and psychological pressure of a peer gr up (Janis 1982) . The staff of Dezenwl II could not arford to form its own allianc ith the staff of the Ba11nrdnungsamt due to their own immediate lo alty to their superior and, at least to some extent, their career options. Split loyalties were also what the staff of the Baunrdmmgsamt wa exposed to. On the one band, these officia l remained the true tor h bea rers of compliance with the rel. evaot ·ecurity regulation. ,On the orher hand lh y t o were acting under the strong pre sure of the alliance of Loveparade s political promoters urging them not to exaggerate their professional sense of duty (or zeal, as om critics probably thought . They probably also knew t·hat U1ey >Ver running the risk of appearing as the pro erbial nay-sayers and that th eir commitment t law enforcement was likely to be perce.ivcd by the outside world as nan·ow-minded bureaucratic tubbornness at' thee ·penses of an innovative project of modem entertainment and yo th cultme. Ultimat ly split loyalties and po litical pressure made the essence f human security negoti able. The rule of law and tbe public interest amalgamated with the private interest of L pavent GmbH to an extent that made the "public and the 'private" irtually indistin gu i hable. The public authority in charge f evaluating and certifying the sec urity concept wer corrupted. The corrupti n did not take place in U1e cia. sic way of bribing public official · but iJ1 tbe more ·ubtle form of sub er ion in the di guise of promoting a public event to the benefit not only of more than one million visitor but also or the city of Duisburg. The ub ersion am ng other things, look tb sbapc of the participation of the priva t fLrm in internal meetings bose purpose houltl ha e been the operationalization of se urity standard and the measures to enforc them, if neces ary against the wi II f the very evenL management firm whose repre entati es al the , rune time were sitting in one and the same room. The Lo eparade disaster was thus far from unavoidable. Instead. it was the co n ·equence of almost del.ibcra!e irresp nsibility. Whal makes the case ex mplary for the Unkage betwe n hybridity and th~ ro l Lre ponslbility in public administration is that core ingredients of both hybridity and irresponsibi lity are at display in an almost pure form. In this respect, the Loveparade case comes clo~c to a natural experiment. The decision makers in charge were not facing a particularly difficult or "wicked" problem . As mentioned above, Lhe st ructure of lhe problem as well as the interests and strategies of the key actors were simple and easy to define. Moreover, the nature of the hybridity in question -a classic case of public-private partnership is as clear and transparent as are the governance mechanisms and logics of action attached to it. /\ccordingly, the motivations of the actors involved and the respective pattems of justification are easy to define as well. II does not take much sophistication or empathy to understand why the private event management firm wanted to rea lize the Loveparade project in the city of Duisburg. espceiaUy after the fai lure to do so in the city of Bochum the year before. And, not surprisingly. local and regionnl politicians across the board were eager to support the project for the sake of enhancing their city's and region's prestige and general standing. The rank-and-file officials in charge of evaluating and certifying the security t.:oneept had to make sure that the relevant regulation was enforced. All of these actors knew that security was not just an abstract notion but thnt. in reality, it affected l.be physical integrity of hundreds of thousands of people.
S~ everybody knew the stakes involved, eve1ybody knew the security risk zones that presented themselves on the compound envisaged for the finnl segment of the Loveparade and any key decision-maker knew about the incompatibility of those risks with what the law required in terms of security standards. So why then the series of disastrous decisions that led to a 13tal outcome? The hybrid arrangement of public-private partnership did not translate itself into urunanageable problems; they just implied a particular challenge to leadership performance. Even thai chal lenge was not particularly dramatic; it ultimately came down to a Yes or No question: Whether or not to obey the law that required certain security standards to be met. What made the relevnnt decision dramatic was the failure of leadership, wllich consisted in a deliberate diffusion of responsibility-in other words: a diffusion 1hat itself cou ld have and should have been avetied but was. in a way, suggested by the hybrid arrangement that shaped the planning and preparation of the LovepaJacle.
Meeting the legally defined security standards was the responsibility of the private event management firm . What occurred when key decisionmakers within the Duisburg city administration adapted to the political pressure to make the Loveparade happen under any circumstances, is that they allowed the responsibility for the fulfilment of the security standards to be shifted to the city administration itself. This, in turn, created not only an inverted incentive structure since it alleviated Lopavent's obligation to deliver a sound security concept according to what the legal stipulations required. At the same time, it burdened the city administration with a task it was neither prepared nor equipped to assume, namely the co-development of a security concept whose main focus was crowd management.
As a consequence, a pattern of path dependency emerged. Precisely because the Duisburg city administration had abandoned the role of an independent public authority whose prime obligation was to declare compliance or non-compliance with security standards clearly laid down in the relevant legal framework and instead had assumed the role of a co-responsible co-organizer of the Loveparade, any exit option became increasingly costly in the course of the protracted process of planning and preparation of the event. While the hybrid arrangement as such certainly had created a permissive environment in which the initial diffusion of responsibility could easily take place, the anticipation of exit costs was a much more powerful and direct counterincentive to reasonable and responsible decision making.
This makes the role of leadership and leadership failure salient, which is at the core of the Loveparade disaster and, again, tightly connected to the phenomenon of hybridity. Obviously, the key public and private actors were not incompetent from a professional point of view. On the contrary, they were experienced and accomplished event managers and public officials. They did not fall prey to what is known as "skilled incompetence" (Argyris 1999) in the sense of the inability to break with professional routines whose skillful application is helpful and efficient under regular circumstances. Rather, the key actors displayed a clear understanding of the non-routine character of the task they had to assume, and they were eager to demonstrate their entrepreneurial capability and willingness to promote unconventional solutions. However, there is good sense in acknowledging that the failure of leadership was a composite of analytical incapacity, ethical insufficiency in the form of a lacking sense of responsibility, and a lack of civil courage.
Those public officials closely cooperating with Lopavent GmbH , despite or because of their obvious readiness to adapt the role of quasi-entrepreneurs as opposed to traditional bureaucrats, lacked, according to all evidence, an appropriate understanding of the pitfalls of the hybrid arrangement they were creating and sustaining. Accordingly, they probably also lacked an appropriate disposition to keep the undesirable effects of the hybrid arrangement under control. They were probably not even aware of those effects. As a matter of fact, no textbook knowledge is available when it comes to the nature and the pitfalls of bybridity in public administration.
The absence of awareness, as far as the pitfalls of the hybrid arrangement were concerned, was probably a contributing factor that explains na'Jvete in handling the situation; it could have been compensated by a sound sense of responsibility. After alL the stakes were high and sufficiently clear to everybody involved. What is more, the legal stipulations designed to protect the physical integrity of the visitors of a mass event such as the Loveparade were clear and strict. As the minutes of the relevant meetings show, the public officials in charge knew that Lopavcnt GmbH could guarantee only one third of the legally required evacuation and escape routes. The determination of public officials to deliberately circumvent the law is at the core of their ethical failure and the essence of inesponsible leadership.
Conclusion: Responsible leadership in hybrid arrangements, new public value governance, and the limits of pragmatism
The present contribution states that the responsible handling of hybrid arrangements and public administration is particularly challenging but feasible. The challenge is neither the increased stmctur::tl complexity of hybrids relative to traditional public administration nor further risk factors such as multiple stakeholder arrangements, inconsistent governance mechanisms or fragmented accountability. Rather it is the inherent incentive to ignore these risks even when the stakes are high and risk management is made easy through appropriate regulation. This is exemplified through an extreme case of leadership failure in a situation shaped by a typical hybrid arrangement of public-private partnership, high stakes of administrative decision-making, and a strict and binding regulatory environment. What makes the case of the Loveparade disaster extreme (and thus exceptional) and, paradoxically, exemplary at the same time is that it demonstrates the force of hybrid arrangements as a permi ssi e en ir nment f, r irresponsible leadership beba ior despite strong countervailing forces in the form ofsecw·ity issues and crystal-lear legal stipulat ion. This underl i11 es the genera l hyp thes i that it i not bybridity a· such that generate ri sk zones of blurred responsibilily and related administra ti ve fai lure but th e oin idence of hybridity and a lack of awareness combined with a weak or absent sense of responsibility. Keeping the undesirable effects of hybridity in public administration under control is thus an issue of both factual and ethical judgment.
The notion of factual judgment refers to the appropriate grasp of (A) the relevant institutional setting and its basic properties (e.g., the nature of hybridity and its inherent ri sks and B) th nature o f the task at hand and the professiona l standards of handljng it (e.g. managing crowd in a publi space and reh ted security regu latio n) . Thi ' is not an irnpo ible J·equire-ment ~1t aJ.I sin ce publi c officials are in principl e u ed to it.lt wa Dwight
Waldo ( 1948 who underlined thal mediation and adjustment t ontradictmy organiza tiona l logics is w hat senior ·taff members i11 public administTation do o n a dai ly basis, given the necess ity to reconcile the pheres of politics and administration. The political sphere is concerned with what is desired and accepted by the public and their elected officials. The administ ·ati ve sphere is concerned with the teclmical and profess ional aspects of a rustinct la k. Accomplished leaders in public administration are well prepared to hand! both. Ac ordingly they ' hould not be particularly cha llenged by U1 additional plurality complexity aml eli erg nl or con tradi ctory requirements Lhal come with the proliferation of hybrid arrangement in the public rea lm and Lhe more or less compl ex ta ks atta hcd to them . And that is what is basically illustrated by the <1bove ca e ·tudy. Dea ling with the challenges of additional complexity and diversity of hybridity or the technical aspects of a public event wa · the least diffi ·ult problern the key actors planning and preparing the Dui burg Loveparade had to deal with. y contra. t ethi ca l judgment remain cmcia l and deli cate when il co mes to th e challenges of bybridity for responsible leader hip. Ethical judgme11t refer to the values shared by pllblic ofticials. Especially when dealing with additional complexity and diversity, much depends on the ability of responsible leaders to rank the impmtancc and legitimacy of the va rious mechanisms and organi zational logic · Lo which their respective institutional unit is exposed (cf. Moore 2014). Fallure to perform this ranking of more or less legitimate incentives and requirements may be just as detri-mental as is the fi1ilure to recof,rnize thciJ· variety in the firsr place. Decision-makers within the Du isburg city administration should have made the physical integrity of ordinary people an absolute value and they shou ld have ranked strict compliance with secudty regulation higher than prestige-seeking through a spectacular street event organized by a private entertainment company. There is no recipe or routine for this kind ofjudgmenL, it is lhc core ingredient or the very sense of responsibility emphasized already by Carl J. Friedrich ( 1940) or Max Weber ( 1988) . The micro-structure of what makes responsible leadership in hybrid arrangements in the public sector particularly challengi ng is characterized by deviances li·om the standard organizational behavior and classic decision styles of traditional administration. The features of hybrid arrangements appeal to a sense of innovation and anti-co.nservatism, non-bureaucratic behavior and civ il society involvement in public affairs. The blurriness of organizational structures that comes with the proliferation of hybridity i.n public administration is thus complemented by an ambivalent psychologica l appeal to leauership mentality. Under these circumstances, the value basis of responsible leadership should be firm and unambiguous. Moore 20 13, 2014) . Some authors (e.g., Moore 1995 Moore , 2014 ) acknowledge a hierarchy oE public values among which, for instance, efficiency, accountability, justness and fairness rank higher than responsiveness or participation. But the general thrust of this strand of liternture is the notion of "what is public is . .. going far beyond government" (Bryson ct al. 20 14, 446) , "citizens seen as problem-solvers and co-creators actively engaged in creating what is valued by the public and is good for U1e pub lic" (ibid.) and that "government acts as convener. catalyst. collaborator. sometimes steeri ng, sometimes, rowing, sometimes partnering, sometimes staying out of the way" (ibid .), selecting "from a menu of alternative delivery mechanisms based on pragmatic criteria" (ibid.). which "often means helping build cross-sector collaborations and engaging citizens to achieve agreed objectives" (i.bid.). Finally. "no one sector has a monopoly on public service ethos" (ibid.) so that "maintaining relationships [between the sectors, W.S.] based on shared public values is essential" (ibid.). So the "new public value" perspective is clearly shaped by a philosophy of value pluralism (cf. Alford/Hughes 2008 ; Moore 2014) and pragmatism in public administration (Hildebrand 2005 (Hildebrand , 2008 Miller 2004; Shields 2003 Shields , 2008 and the related logic of appropriateness when it comes to public administration decision-making ( cf . Hood 1991; March/Olsen 1989; Olsen 2008) . There are instances of decision-making in public administration in which, by contrast, a logic of consequentiality is imperative: judgment of public officials based on basic values and a related public service ethos. Circumstances where human lives are at stake and legal provisions designed to protect them are in place are a clear case in point. The relevant officials of the Duisburg city administration in charge of planning and preparation of the Loveparade event were, instead, driven by a logic of appropriateness and hyper-pragmatism. They soon abandoned their monopoly in defining security standards according to unmistakable legal provisions. They made the physical integrity of people attending a public event negotiable by delegating their exclusive responsibility for the . evaluation and certification of security standards to a private firm seeking -, .profit and prestige. These officials defined private sector individuals as "problem-solvers and co-creators actively engaged in creating what is valued by the public and is good for the public" (Bryson et al. 2014, 446) . They acted as "convener, catalyst, collaborator, sometimes steering, sometimes, rowing, sometimes partnering, sometimes staying out of the way" (ibid.), selecting "from a menu of alternative delivery mechanisms based on pragmatic criteria" (ibid.), which meant "helping build cross-sector collaborations and engaging citizens to achieve agreed objectives" (ibid.). They thus firmly rejected the notion of the public sector having "a monopoly on public service ethos" (ibid.). In other words, they did what the "new public value" school advocates for. As a consequence, those officials were not able and not willing to walk the line between pragmatism and mere opportunism and blame shifting. So there is good sense in defining hybridity as a pennissive environment for misguided pragmatism and inesponsible leadership. Obviously, the praise of pragmatism that characterizes the "new public value" school of thought is the opposite of what could strengthen the even more indispensable sense of responsibility among public officials. Rather than broaden indiscriminately the vaJue basi of public administration as suggc ted by the 'ne'< public alue·· ·chool of thought, it is imperative to differentiate between l11c very basic value of democracy and re ·ponsible go ernment and the diversity f econd order aluc that necessarily shape the environmelll of evc1 y public administration. Protecting evezybody ' 1 by ical i11tegrity afeguarding human and civil right enforcing the rul of law, guaranteeing due proces transparency and incli idual accountability of elected and appointed officials remain the bedrock of public admini lration howe er pluralistic and differentiated it. organizational structure and t-he environment of societal value to which it i expo cd.
